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Labor Migration in the Public Eye: 
Attitudes Towards Labor Migrants in Israel 
by Rebeca Raijman1 and Moshe Semyonov 2 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Schwerpunkte dieses Artikels sind (1) Einstellungen, Normen und Wertschätzung ge-
genüber Wanderarbeitern von außerhalb Israels  sowie (2) die Abhängigkeit der Einstel-
lungen von demografischen wie sozioökonomischen Merkmalen israelischer Bürger. Die 
Daten weisen darauf hin, daß Israelis deutlich negative Einstellungen gegenüber Arbeits-
migranten äußern. Diese werden in kultureller, sozialer und politischer Hinsicht ausge-
grenzt. Die soziale Ausgrenzung manifestiert sich in sozialer Distanz und der Unterstüt-
zung diskriminierenden Verhaltens (besonders wenn es zu einem Eindringen in die Privat-
sphäre kommt). Darüber hinaus werden die Gastarbeiter häufig nicht nur als Konkurren-
ten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt gesehen, sondern auch als eine Bedrohung in anderen sozialen 
Bereichen wie Wohlstand, Ausbildung, Gesundheit und Wohnen. Steigender Wettbewerb 
um knappe Ressourcen führt zu einer größeren Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Die meisten Israelis 
scheinen Einwanderern soziale und politische Rechte vorenthalten zu wollen. Ein Teil der 
verwendeten Items dieser Untersuchung wurde aus dem ALLBUS 1996 übernommen. 
Abstract 
The major goal of the present paper (1) is to describe attitudes, norms and values toward 
migrant workers, and (2) to evaluate the extent to which attitudes toward migrant workers 
are related to demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the citizens of Israel. 
The data indicate that Israelis have substantial negative attitude toward labor migrants. 
These are perceived as outsiders in the cultural, social and political spheres. The social 
exclusion is manifested through feelings of social distance and the support for discriminat-
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ing behavior (especially when it comes to intrusion in citizens’ private lives). Furthermore, 
foreign workers are often viewed not only as competitors in the labor market but as a 
threat in other social realms (welfare, education, health and housing). Increased competi-
tion over scarce resources, generates greater hostility toward outgroup members - the for-
eign workers. Most Israelis seem to be willing to deny them social and political rights. 
Part of the items was taken from the ALLBUS 1996. 
Introduction 
Labor migration is a recent phenomenon in Israeli society. During the 1990s an increasing 
number of migrant workers (both documented and undocumented) were recruited and in-
corporated into the Israeli labor market, amounting to approximately 8 percent of the labor 
force. Their presence is growingly felt as they seem to be changing not only the labor mar-
ket composition, but the ethnic fabric of the Israeli metropolis as well (Bartram, 1998; 
Borowski and Yanay, 1997; Schnell, 1999; Kemp et al. 2000). The influx of migrant 
workers has produced a challenge to the ethno-national nature of the state and its tradi-
tional definitions of membership (Kemp et al. 2000). The incorporation of labor migrants 
within the Israeli society raises the question how non-Jewish labor migrants are perceived 
in a country that encourages Jewish immigration while actively discourages non-Jewish 
immigration. Although the number of migrant workers have increased considerably, very 
little research has been done on the impact of such migration on attitudes and behavior 
toward foreign workers in Israel, see Bar-Tzuri (1996, 1999) and Pedahzur and Yishai 
(1999) for an exception. The major goal of the present paper, though, is to describe the 
social climate towards labor migrants in Israel. More specifically our goal is twofold: (1) to 
describe attitudes, norms and values towards migrant workers, and (2) to evaluate the ex-
tent to which attitudes toward migrant workers are related to demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the citizens of Israel.  
This paper proceeds as follows. After presenting the Israeli case (Section II), the theoreti-
cal background (Section III), and the methodology (Section IV) we proceed to the data 
analysis (Section V). More specifically, we focus on the attitudes respondents hold with 
regard to the following issues: (1) discriminating behavior, (2) expressed preference for 
social distance, (3) labor market consequences of foreign workers presence, (4) perception 
of competition over socio-economic resources, and (5) attitudes towards socio-economic 
and political rights of labor migrants. In the conclusions (Section VI) we summarize the 
main findings and discuss the implications for the status of foreign workers in Israel. 
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The Israeli Setting 
Israel is a country inhabited by Jewish immigrants from practically every continent of the 
world. Jews arrived in Israel in a sequence of waves. The first arrived at the turn of the 20th 
century mainly from Eastern European countries. During the first decade after statehood 
(1948) the population of Israel tripled, mainly due to massive immigration of refugees 
from Moslem countries in Middle-Asia and North-Africa along with survivors of the holo-
caust. Immigration during the three decades that followed was more scattered and less sys-
tematic, and characterized by a slow but constant stream of immigrants from North and 
South America as well as immigrants from South Africa, Eastern Europe, Ethiopia and 
Iran. The most recent flow of massive migration started in 1989 following the fall of the 
former Soviet Union. 
Unlike other immigrant-receiving societies, Israel is committed to the successful absorp-
tion of its (Jewish) immigrants. According to the law of return (1950) and the law of na-
tionality (1952) every Jew has the right to settle in Israel and immigrants can be awarded 
Israeli citizenship upon arrival. The country relies on the system of pure jus sanguinis to 
determine the citizenship status of immigrants and their descendants. Unwillingness to 
accept non-Jewish immigrants is expressed through exclusionary immigration policies (es-
pecially limitation of family reunion and refusal to secure residence status), restrictive 
naturalization rules and a double standard: exclusionary model for non-Jews vis-a-vis “ac-
ceptance-encouragement” model for Jews. Thus, Israel can be viewed as an immigrant-
settler society based on an ethno-nationalist structure, defined both ideologically and insti-
tutionally (Smooha, 1990).  
Following the six days war in 1967, Israel has begun to rely on non-citizen Arab workers 
from the West Bank and Gaza strip to perform mostly menial, low status, manual jobs 
(mostly in construction, agriculture and services) comprising about 8 percent of the Israeli 
labor force by the late 1980s (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987). After the beginning of 
the Palestinian uprising in 1987 (intifada), daily commuting of Arab workers from the 
West Bank and Gaza was curtailed. As a result, economic sectors in which Palestinian 
workers had been concentrated suffered from labor shortages.  
The temporary solution sought to overcome labor shortages was import of overseas labor 
migrants. By 1987 the number of permits accorded by the Israeli Ministry of Labor was 
2,500, and it increased gradually up to 9,600 in 1993 when Israel began importing large 
numbers of overseas migrant workers primarily from Romania (construction sector); Thai-
land (agriculture sector) and Philippines (geriatric care, nursing and domestic services). In 
1996, the total number of work permits valid was estimated in circa 103,000 (see Bartram 
1998: Table 3). From those, 72 percent working in the construction industry, 16 percent in 
agriculture, 7 percent in nursing and geriatric care, and 5 percent in the service sector 
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(Lerer, 1996). In Israel, unlike other Western European countries work permits are given 
to employers, but not to employees, thus transforming documented workers into a de-facto 
„captive labor force“ (Calavita, 1992; Rozenhak, 1998). 
Similarly to other labor importing countries, Israeli official figures do not reflect the real 
number of labor migrants in society. To reach accurate figures one needs to take into con-
sideration the number of undocumented labor migrants (working without permits or illegal 
workers) in Israel whose number has dramatically increased in recent years. Indeed, lack of 
valid data makes it difficult to estimate the current number of undocumented workers that 
live and work in Israel. Although official sources estimate a conservative figure that ranges 
between 80,000 and 100,000 illegal workers (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998; State 
Comptroller Office 1996: 490; Ministry of Labor and Welfare, 2000) other sources suggest 
up to a maximum of 300,000 undocumented migrants living and working in Israel 
(Ha’aretz, 1996). Undocumented non-Jewish labor migrants come from literally every 
corner in the world: Ex-USSR (25%); South Asia (20%); East Europe (15%); Latin Amer-
ica (15%); Africa (14%) and Arab countries (11%) (Ministry of Interior, 1996).  
 As in most Western European countries, migrant workers in Israel are considered an im-
port of temporary workers and not prospective citizens. They are deemed outsiders in the 
cultural, social, and political spheres (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994; Schnapper, 
1994). Their presence has become a major public issue around which much debate between 
different state and non-state actors takes place. The explicit position of the Israeli State 
regarding labor migration is that Israel is not an „immigration“ country but rather an 
„Aliya“ (Jewish immigration) country. As such, its jurisdiction extends to labor migration 
policy (work permits, deportation) rather than to labor migrants’ needs. Conversely, non-
state actors like various Non Government Organizations, advocacy groups and the local 
government of Tel Aviv (where the majority of the undocumented labor migrants live) are 
pushing towards a recognition of labor migrants’ socio-economic rights (Kemp and Rai-
jman, 2000). The purpose of our research is to provide a descriptive overview regarding 
attitudes toward foreign workers in Israel. By doing so, we provide additional source of 
information regarding the social climate and the emergence of public perception of labor 
migrants in Israeli society. 
Theoretical Background 
Social scientists have long studied attitudes and actions toward ethnic minorities to better 
understand sources and mechanisms underlying discrimination, socio-economic inequality, 
and ethnic antagonism. The ever growing literature on the topic uniformly suggests that the 
relative position of an ethnic group in a society is strongly influenced by public attitudes 
and government actions both comprising the context of reception (Portes and Rumbaut, 
1990; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994).  
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Studies on ethnic relations agree that the normative context of society as reflected by atti-
tudes, beliefs and actions, is greatly influenced by the conception of citizenship and na-
tionality (Hoskin, 1991: Brubaker, 1992; Castles and Miller, 1993; Edwards-Baldwin and 
Schain, 1994; Soysal, 1994). Thus, researchers tend to differentiate between basic models 
of incorporation ranging between the exclusion (folk or ethnic) model on one end of the 
continuum, to foreigners inclusion (multicultural) model on the other end of the continuum 
(Castles and Miller, 1993; Faist, 1994). 
The exclusion – folk or ethnic – model is typical of ethnically homogenous societies. In 
such societies membership is based on common descent, language, and culture. Migrants 
are likely to be denied social membership and citizenship, hence, non-ethnic are excluded 
from social, civil and political rights. The multicultural model is typical for countries 
where there is a formal recognition of cultural and ethnic differences and membership in 
the community is granted to foreigners. In such societies the community is based on consti-
tution, laws and citizenship. While the US, Canada, Australia and Sweden represent the 
latter model, Germany and Israel are examples of the former-exclusion-model. 
The last three decades show a trend of continuous increase in anti-immigrant sentiments 
and ethnic tension in many Western Countries. Research conducted in North America, 
Western Europe, and Australia, reveal (mostly) negative anti-immigrants and anti-ethnic 
attitudes (e.g. Miller et al. 1984; Polinard et al., 1985; Goot, 1991; Suarez-Orozco, 1992; 
Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Gaasholt and Togeby, 
1995; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996) or ambivalent in several cases (e.g. Harwood, 
1986; Cornelius, 1992a; Cornelius, 1992b). Even in countries that are latecomers to the 
import of foreign workers (i.e. Greece, Spain, Italy) anti-immigrants sentiments are evident 
(Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994).  
The degree of ethnic hostility and anti-immigrants attitudes is likely to vary with socio-
economic status, employment status, education, and age (Miller et al., 1984; Polinard et 
al., 1985; Hoskin, 1991; Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; 
Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Bar-Tzuri, 1996, 1999). In general, poor people, un-
employed, and individuals with low levels of education are more likely to reveal hostile 
attitudes toward ethnic immigrants. In addition, cultural and personal traits are found to be 
associated with attitudes toward ethnic immigrants. For example, traditional orientation, 
religiosity, and political orientation are likely to increase distance between groups and an-
tagonism toward immigrants (McAllister and Moore, 1991; Ruefle et al., 1992; Enoch, 
1994; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Pedahzur and Yishai, 1999). Conservative views may encour-
age natives to oppose labor migration and therefore to exclude them from any kind of 
rights. Finally, individuals with vulnerable positions in the labor market (i.e. subordinate 
ethnic minorities) tend to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. The antagonism ex-
pressed by persons of lower socio-economic status, is apparently a result of perception of 
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threat to livelihoods and standard of living, and of competition for scarce resources (Miller 
et al., 1984; Polinard et al., 1985; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Gaashlot and Togeny, 
1995).  
Methodology 
The analysis reported here is based on a survey of the adult Israeli population based on a 
stratified sample of 1,100 respondents conducted in Israel during the second half of 1999. 
A questionnaire containing attitudes and beliefs toward immigrants and labor migrants was 
modelled after instruments developed in the following studies: Eurobarometer Survey 
(Western Europe), the General Survey of the Social Sciences – ALLBUS – (Germany), 
and the survey organized by the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion. In addition the 
questionnaire contains data on demographic, socio-economic and labor force characteris-
tics of respondents. The interview was conducted face-to-face and lasted about 40 minutes. 
The rate of response was 50 percent which is typical in the Israeli society. 
The citizens of Israel can be divided into three major distinct geo-cultural groups: Jewish 
immigrants from Europe and the Americas (mostly Ashkenazi) at the top of the ethnic hi-
erarchy; Jewish immigrants who arrived from Asia and North Africa (mostly Sepharadic); 
and non-Jews (mostly Arabs who lived in the region for generations and are at the bottom 
of the social ladder (e.g. Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993). The split between Jews and 
Arabs is much more pronounced than the differences between the two Jewish ethnic 
groups. 
In Appendix 1 we provide a socio-economic profile of the adult population included in the 
sample for Jews and Arabs, respectively. Arabs are oversampled to provide large number 
for statistical analysis. Jewish respondents were classified in two ethnic categories (Asian-
African or European-American according to their place of birth (for foreign-born) or by 
father’s place of birth (for native-born). Over 55 percent of the Jewish population are of 
European-American origin, while 45 percent are of Asian-African descent.  
Differences between Jews and Arabs are evident with regard to most characteristics dis-
played in the table. Jews are characterized by higher levels of formal schooling (28 percent 
hold an academic degree versus 14 percent among Arabs) and are overrepresented in the 
high status occupations. Jews and Arabs also differ in their political orientation (which has 
implications regarding the position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict) and degree of religi-
osity. The majority of the Israeli Arab population reported being political left-oriented 
compared to only 27 percent among Jews. Whereas half of the Jewish population defined 
itself as secular circa 40 percent of the Arab population (most of them Moslem) reported 
being Orthodox oriented towards religion. Overall our sample adequately represents the 
Israeli adult population. 
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Data Analysis 
The presence of migrant workers in Israel is of special interest because it challenges the 
basic definition of Israeli society which encourages permanent settlement of Jewish immi-
grants and discourages settlement of non-Jews. Thus, we expect Jews and Arabs to differ 
in their support of Jewish and non-Jewish migration. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it seems in order to present public attitudes toward 
migration in Israel. Appendix 2 displays respondents’ support regarding entrance of three 
different groups to Israel: labor migrants, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and 
new (Jewish) immigrants. The attitudes towards different types of immigrants vary accord-
ing to ethnicity. As expected Jews still embrace Jewish immigration as a national goal thus 
displaying favorable attitudes toward „new immigrants“. Almost two-thirds support their 
unrestricted entrance opposed to only 8 percent of Israeli Arabs. However, a certain level 
of hostility toward Jewish immigration exists even within the Jewish population as one-
third of both citizens of European-American origin and Asian-African origin support re-
stricted entrance of „new immigrants“. It is interesting to note that the consensus regarding 
the relevance of Jewish migration has eroded over time, especially since the beginning of 
the massive flow of migration from the former Soviet Union (Leshem, 1998). 
Israeli Jews do not endorse free entrance of either foreign workers or Palestinians. Never-
theless, they were more likely to support restricted entrance of foreign workers and more 
likely to prohibit the entrance of non-citizen Palestinian workers. Compared to Jews, Is-
raeli Arabs display a more negative attitude towards foreign workers. Almost 60 percent of 
Arabs supported “prohibition of entrance” compared to roughly one-quarter among Jews.  
Arab attitudes are divided regarding the entrance of Palestinians workers into the Israeli 
labor market. Although two-thirds support their entry (either unrestricted or restricted), 28 
percent support the prohibition of labor migration from the Occupied Territories. Jews 
however, are more supportive of prohibition of Palestinian workers entrance with 54 per-
cent among Asian-Africans and 36 percent among European-American. 
Social Distance 
Responses to five questions are used to measure social distance from foreign workers. Each 
question pertains to how close one would allow a foreign worker to approach one or one’s 
family. The results classified by ethnicity, education and income levels are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Social Distance by Ethnicity, Education and Earning .  * P<.05 
 Would it be 
unpleasant if 
your neighbor 
was a foreign 
worker 
 
 
Would it be 
unpleasant 
that a foreign 
worker mar-
ries someone 
in your fam-
ily 
 
Would it be 
unpleasant 
that your child 
studies in the 
same class-
room with a 
child (born to 
foreign work-
ers) 
Would it be 
unpleasant to 
have a for-
eign worker 
supervising 
your work 
 
 
 % Unpleasant 
(-1 to -3) 
% Unpleasant 
(-1 to -3) 
% Unpleasant 
(-1 to -3) 
% Unpleasant 
(-1 to -3) 
By Ethnicity    
Jews Europe-America 38.5%* 76.1%* 29.5%* 57.9%* 
Jews Asia-Africa 50.7%* 86.3%* 43.9%* 67%* 
Arabs 81.3%* 91.9%* 70.6% 78.6%* 
By Education    
Less then high school 69.4%* 89.9%* 57.9%* 75.9%* 
High school 53.9%* 85.6%* 43.8%* 69.6%* 
Higher then high school  45.6%* 78.8%* 39.7%* 59.7%* 
By Earning     
Low 56.9%* 86%* 50.5%* 69.8%* 
Middle 56.4%* 81.6%* 45.8%* 65.2%* 
High  43.6%* 82.4%* 34.5%* 60.6%* 
Total  54.3% 83.8% 45.6% 66.6% 
An overview of the respondents’ attitudes toward foreign workers reveals a relatively con-
sistent pattern of negative and prejudicial attitudes. About 84 percent of respondents found 
it unpleasant if a foreign worker was to marry a member of the family. Over 66 percent of 
the respondents said that it would be unpleasant to have a foreign worker as supervisor at 
work. About 46 percent of respondents reported it as unpleasant if foreign workers’ child 
shares the same classroom with respondents’ child. And, 54 percent said that it would be 
unpleasant if a foreign worker was a neighbor. 
The data reveal significant association between ethnicity, educational level, and level of 
income to the perception of social distance. Jews (and more so European-American Jews) 
reported lower levels of unpleasantness than Arabs on all four items. That is, “unpleasant-
ness“ is likely to rise with level of ethnic subordination. Similarly, respondents of lower 
socio-economic status (education and income) tend to express stronger feelings of social 
distance (i.e. greater level of unpleasantness). 
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Attitudes toward Discrimination of Foreign Workers 
A series of questions were used to measure attitudes of the Israeli population concerning 
discriminating behavior towards labor migrants. The items were taken from ALLBUS and 
translated into Hebrew. Respondents were asked about their personal opinion with regard 
to three situations. The patterns of response (means and standard deviations) by ethnicity, 
education and income are presented in Table 2. A four-step scale was used (1=just fine 
through 4=not fine at all). Analysis of variance was conducted in order to establish whether 
the mean scores on each attitude differed significantly by ethnicity and by levels of educa-
tion and income. 
Table 2:   Attitude toward discrimination by Ethnicity, Education and Earning . 
Means and (Standard Deviations).  * P<.05 
 A restaurant 
owner refuses to 
serve a foreign 
worker 
Parents forbid their 17-
year-old daughter from 
pursuing a friendship 
relationship with a 
foreign worker 
A factory owner 
that has to down-
size, fires foreign 
workers first 
By Ethnicity   
Jews Europe-
America 
3.63  
(0.71) 
2.04*  
(1) 
2.21  
(0.97) 
Jews Asia-Africa 3.58  
(0.8) 
1.72*  
(0.97) 
1.84*  
(0.93) 
Arabs  2.05*  
(0.97) 
1.52*  
(0.74) 
2.2  
(1.07) 
By Education   
Less then high 
school 
2.77*  
(1.17) 
1.68  
(0.96) 
2  
(1.07) 
High school 3.18*  
(1.11) 
1.72  
(0.97) 
2.03  
(1.01) 
Higher then high 
school  
3.39*  
(0.93) 
1.9*  
(0.92) 
2.18*  
(0.95) 
By Earning   
Low 3.06  
(1.1) 
1.77  
(0.97) 
2.08  
(1.04) 
Middle  3.16  
(1.1) 
1.82  
(0.94) 
2.11  
(1) 
High  3.61*  
(0.76) 
1.93  
(0.97) 
2.12  
(0.93) 
Total 3.17  
(1.08) 
1.79  
(0.95) 
2.09  
(1.01) 
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The findings are in line with the theoretical expectations. In general respondents of Euro-
pean-American origin (the superordinate group), with higher education and with higher 
levels of income were less likely to support discriminatory conduct. However there are 
meaningful differences in the degree respondents objected or accepted discriminatory be-
havior. Respondents express more liberal attitudes in situations related to the public sphere 
(when a restaurant owner refuses to serve a foreign worker) and in the labor market area 
(when a factory owner has to downsize) than in the private sphere (intimate relationships 
within the family).  
Labor Market Consequences of Foreign Workers Presence 
Labor market consequences of labor migration can be summarized in two models: the 
competition and the complementarity hypothesis. The Labor Market Complementarity 
Model suggests that labor migrants do not compete with native workers over the same jobs; 
they take the jobs natives are not willing to perform. Conversely, the Labor Market Com-
petition model refers to the frequent complaint about immigrants taking jobs away from 
native workers, contributing to higher rates of unemployment, and driving down wages and 
working conditions in a series of occupations. Thus, it is expected that minorities and per-
sons of low socio-economic status (who are more likely to compete with foreign workers) 
would be more hostile and antagonistic toward foreign workers while persons of higher 
status would be more tolerant towards the presence of foreign workers in the labor market.  
A series of questions were presented to respondents with regard to the presence and impact 
of foreign workers in the labor market. Respondents were asked to express their agreement 
on a seven-step scale (1=don’t agree at all; 7= completely agree). Analysis of variance was 
conducted in order to establish whether the mean scores on each attitude differed signifi-
cantly by ethnicity, education, and income, respectively (see Table 3). Items in columns 3, 
4 and 5 were taken from ALLBUS and translated into Hebrew. 
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Table 3:  Attitudes to Foreign Workers and Labor Market Consequences by Ethnicity, 
Education, Earning. Means and (Standard deviations).  * P<.05 
 „Pre-
eminence of 
Employ-
ment should 
be given to 
Israelis“ 
„Foreign 
workers 
should be 
allowed to 
work only in 
specific 
occupa-
tions“ 
„In a state of 
unemploy-
ment in the 
labor market 
foreigners 
should be 
sent back to 
their coun-
tries of origin 
„Foreign 
workers 
take work 
from Israeli 
citizens“ 
„Foreign 
workers in 
Israel do the 
work that 
Israeli citi-
zens do not 
want to“ 
„Israeli 
citizens 
deserve 
higher 
wages than 
foreign 
workers“ 
By Ethnicity  
Jews Europe-
America  
6.41*  
(1.43) 
4.14  
(2.49) 
4.72*  
(2.2) 
3.76*  
(2.41) 
5.86  
(1.85) 
4.36*  
(2.56) 
Jews Asia-
Africa  
6.78*  
(0.97) 
4.14  
(2.49) 
5.55  
(2.06) 
5.03*  
(2.35) 
5.65  
(2.03) 
5.36  
(2.27) 
Arabs  5.69*  
(1.8) 
4.61*  
(1.91) 
5.81  
(1.66) 
5.75*  
(1.8) 
4.62*  
(2.14) 
5.37  
(1.88) 
By Education 
Less then high 
school 
6.24  
(1.56) 
4.4  
(2.34) 
5.86*  
(1.81) 
5.64*  
(1.97) 
4.88*  
(2.29) 
5.55  
(2.08) 
High school 6.44  
(1.38) 
4.26  
(2.43) 
5.53*  
(2.01) 
5.08*  
(2.31) 
5.56  
(1.96) 
5.24  
(2.24) 
Higher then 
high school  
6.29  
(1.5) 
4.21  
(2.37) 
4.79*  
(2.15) 
3.98*  
(2.42) 
5.7  
(1.92) 
4.45*  
(2.45) 
By Earning 
Low 6.32  
(1.49) 
4.29  
(2.38) 
5.47*  
(2.07) 
4.97*  
(2.39) 
5.11*  
(2.24) 
5.14*  
(2.34) 
Middle 6.29  
(1.51) 
4.18  
(2.28) 
5.22  
(2) 
4.6  
(2.35) 
5.55*  
(1.95) 
4.86  
(2.28) 
High  6.49  
(1.33) 
4.24  
(2.54) 
4.94  
(2.26) 
4.25  
(2.45) 
6.02*  
(1.69) 
4.64  
(2.46) 
Total  6.32  
(1.48) 
4.28  
(2.37) 
5.29  
(2.07) 
4.96  
(2.34) 
5.45  
(2.06) 
4.73  
(2.38) 
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Regardless of ethnicity, education and earnings level, there is a general agreement that pre-
eminence of employment should be given to Israelis. Although less strong, there is also a 
general consensus regarding the issue of sending back labor migrants in case of unem-
ployment. Israelis also tend to support the view that citizens deserve higher wages than 
foreign workers and that these workers should be allowed to work only in specific occupa-
tions (although not as strongly). Subordinate ethnic groups and respondents in low status 
positions are more likely to express more discriminatory attitudes toward guest workers. 
Conversely, respondents with higher levels of education and earnings are more likely to 
express liberal attitudes.  
Respondents of European-American origin were more likely than others to support the 
view that “foreign workers take the jobs Israelis are not willing to do” (complementarity 
hypothesis). Conversely, Asian-African Jews and even more so Israeli Arabs were likely to 
support the view that foreign workers compete, take work and opportunities from Israeli 
citizens (the competition hypothesis). This is not surprising, in light of the fact that subor-
dinate ethnic groups are overrepresented in the low-status and low-skilled occupations 
where they are more likely to compete directly with foreign workers. 
Education and earnings levels also explain variation in attitudes towards labor market con-
sequences generated by labor migration. Perception of economic competition is associated 
with lower levels of education and earnings whereas the idea of complementarity is 
strongly sustained by those respondents with the higher levels of education and earnings. 
Perception of Competition over Socio-economic Resources 
Perceived threat from foreign workers might affect the way citizens think about the pres-
ence of foreigners in the host society. Increased competition over scarce resources, is likely 
to generate greater hostility toward outgroup members because outgroup members are of-
ten perceived as a threat to ingroup prerogatives. To measure the perception of competition 
over socio-economic resources respondents were asked „to what extent foreign workers in 
Israel“ affect their housing, health, education, social benefits, wages and employment op-
portunities. A seven-step scale was used where ‘1’ means don’t agree at all (low competi-
tion) and 7 means I completely agree (high competition). The means and standard devia-
tions of respondents’ attitudes by ethnicity, education and income levels are presented in 
Table 4. Analysis of variance was conducted in order to establish whether the mean scores 
on each attitude differed significantly by the categories of the independent variables. 
18   ZA-Information 47 
Table 4:  Perception of Competition over Socio-economic Resources by Ethnicity , 
Education and Earning . Means and (Standard Deviations). * P<.05 
To what 
extent for-
eign work-
ers in Israel 
affect your 
... 
Social 
Benefits 
Wage  
levels 
Employ-
ment 
Chances 
Level of 
Health 
Services 
you are 
entitled to 
Level 
(quality) 
of Educa-
tion of 
your chil-
dren 
Chances 
of finding 
decent 
housing 
The Hous-
ing condi-
tions in 
your area 
of resi-
dence 
By Ethnicity  
Jews 
Europe-
America  
2.7* 
(2.24) 
2.96* 
(2.47) 
2.68* 
(2.39) 
2.18* 
(2.03) 
2.66* 
(2.3) 
2.14* 
(2.03) 
2.9 
(2.42) 
Jews 
Asia-
Africa 
3.54 
(2.52) 
3.92* 
(2.64) 
3.73* 
(2.74) 
2.69 
(2.34) 
3.36* 
(2.57) 
2.97 
(2.54) 
3.87* 
(2.69) 
Arabs  3.48 
(2.22) 
4.69* 
(2.43) 
4.66* 
(2.58) 
2.82 
(1.96) 
3* 
(1.96) 
3.3 
(2.29) 
2.75 
(2.12) 
By Education 
Less then 
high 
school 
3.71 
(2.5) 
4.62* 
(2.57) 
4.67* 
(2.68) 
3.04* 
(2.33) 
3.22 
(2.32) 
3.2 
(2.49) 
3.32 
(2.52) 
High 
school 
3.38 
(2.43) 
4.09* 
(2.62) 
3.98* 
(2.69) 
2.67* 
(2.25) 
3.16 
(2.39) 
3.08 
(2.47) 
3.54 
(2.58) 
Higher 
then high 
school  
2.77* 
(2.15) 
3.02* 
(2.42) 
2.67* 
(2.37) 
2.14* 
(1.85) 
2.71* 
(2.24) 
2.25* 
(2.03) 
2.86* 
(2.35) 
By Earning 
Low 3.44 
(2.42) 
4.26* 
(2.61) 
4.06* 
(2.7) 
2.73 
(2.26) 
3.26* 
(2.43) 
3.05 
(2.47) 
3.18 
(2.53) 
Middle  3.16 
(2.32) 
3.71* 
(2.56) 
3.54* 
(2.63) 
2.48 
(2.04) 
2.86 
(2.18) 
2.73 
(2.25) 
3.2 
(2.45) 
High  2.57* 
(2.03) 
2.6* 
(2.32) 
2.3* 
(2.29) 
2.12* 
(1.86) 
2.64 
(2.22) 
1.85* 
(1.78) 
2.78 
(2.29) 
Total  3.18 
(2.36) 
3.75 
(2.61) 
3.56 
(2.68) 
2.52 
(2.13) 
2.98 
(2.32) 
2.73 
(2.33) 
3.17 
(2.48) 
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Perception of competition is most evident at the economic level. This perception is most 
apparent among subordinate groups (Asian-African origin and most strongly Israeli Arabs) 
who tend to feel that the presence of foreign workers in the country has detrimental conse-
quences for both their employment opportunities and wage levels.  
Perception of competition over resources such as social benefits, health services, education 
and housing is not as pronounced as the perception of labor market competition. It is inter-
esting to note that migrant workers are not entitled to receive any of the services (health 
and housing) granted by the state to their citizens. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of 
respondents in the sample (circa 20 percent) perceive that the presence of labor migrants in 
society negatively affect their housing, education and welfare rights. Here too, significant 
differences in attitudes are evident by ethnicity, education and earnings. Arabs and Jews of 
Asian-African origin and individuals with low education and earnings tend to perceive a 
greater threat and competition generated by foreign workers than others. Somewhat sur-
prising are the findings regarding perception of competition over social resources among 
Israeli Arabs. Although the majority of the Arab population live in segregated communities 
and thus, are the least likely to be affected (especially in housing and schooling) by foreign 
workers, they still express negative attitudes concerning the impact of foreign workers on 
the neighborhood and school.  
Attitudes towards Socio-Economic and Political Rights of Foreign Workers 
In this section we focus on public opinion towards socio-economic and political rights of 
labor migrants. Respondents were asked “to what extent do you agree that foreign workers 
should have the same rights as Jews” regarding socio-economic and political rights. Items 
in colums 1 and 3 were taken from ALLBUS and translated into Hebrew. A seven-step 
scale was used where ‘1’ means don’t agree at all and 7 means I completely agree. The 
results (by ethnicity, education and income levels) are presented in Table 5. Analysis of 
variance was conducted in order to establish whether the mean scores on each attitude dif-
fered significantly by ethnicity, education and income levels. 
A clear-cut picture regarding entitlement of different types of rights to foreign workers in 
the Israeli society arises depending on the different types of rights (socio-economic, politi-
cal) and who should provide the specific right (the state or the employer). The data clearly 
reveal that respondents differentiate between rights provided by the state vis a vis rights 
that should be provided by employers. 
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Table 5: Attitudes towards Socio-economic and Political Rights of Foreign Workers 
by Ethnicity, Education, Earning. Means and (Standard Deviations). * P<.05 
 “All 
political 
activities 
should be 
prohib-
ited for 
foreign 
workers 
residing 
in Israel“ 
“Foreign 
workers 
living in 
Israel 
should be 
given the 
right to 
union-
ize“ 
“Foreign 
workers 
should 
have the 
right to 
vote for 
the local 
govern-
ment“ 
“The 
State 
should 
provide 
welfare 
for the 
foreign 
workers“ 
“The 
State 
should 
provide 
educa-
tion for 
the for-
eign 
workers“ 
“The 
State 
should 
provide 
decent 
housing 
for the 
foreign 
workers“ 
“The em-
ployers 
should be 
forced to 
provide 
insurance 
against 
work 
accidents 
to their 
foreign 
workers“ 
“Mini-
mum 
wages 
for for-
eign 
workers 
should  
be as-
sured“ 
By Ethnicity 
Jews 
Europe-
America 
5.29 
(2.41) 
3.96* 
(2.55) 
1.92 
(1.81) 
3.94* 
(2.38) 
3.97* 
(2.47) 
3.79* 
(2.46) 
6.29 
(1.67) 
5.69 
(2.18) 
Jews 
Asia-Africa 
5.88* 
(2.1) 
3.51 
(2.59) 
1.77 
(1.74) 
3.27* 
(2.4) 
3.31* 
(2.5) 
3.44* 
(2.53) 
6.22 
(1.79) 
5.78 
(2.11) 
Arabs  5.26 
(1.78) 
3.66 
(2.46) 
3.01* 
(2.06) 
2.82* 
(1.66) 
2.72* 
(1.66) 
2.97* 
(1.87) 
3.63* 
(2.24) 
3.08* 
(1.98) 
By Education 
Less then 
High 
school 
5.41 
(2.14) 
3.04* 
(2.35) 
2.27 
(2) 
2.86* 
(2.06) 
2.7* 
(2.04) 
3.06* 
(2.28) 
4.98* 
(2.45) 
4.42* 
(2.53) 
High 
school 
5.72* 
(2.05) 
3.73 
(2.46) 
2.13 
(1.97) 
3.33* 
(2.23) 
3.3* 
(2.32) 
3.5 
(2.44) 
5.49* 
(2.2) 
5.12 
(2.37) 
Higher then 
High 
school  
5.33 
(2.25) 
3.98 
(2.47) 
2.15 
(1.88) 
3.79* 
(2.3) 
3.87* 
(2.41) 
3.63 
(2.33) 
5.85* 
(2.04) 
5.24 
(2.33) 
By Earning 
Low  5.27 
(2.29) 
3.43 
(2.43) 
2.25 
(1.98) 
3.39 
(2.24) 
3.28 
(2.27) 
3.33 
(2.35) 
5.45 
(2.23) 
5.07 
(2.35) 
Middle  5.58 
(1.99) 
3.98* 
(2.39) 
2.34 
(1.99) 
3.31 
(2.18) 
3.32 
(2.29) 
3.41 
(2.31) 
5.45 
(2.25) 
4.84 
(2.48) 
High  5.42 
(2.37) 
3.74* 
(2.67) 
1.69* 
(1.59) 
3.76* 
(2.32) 
3.89* 
(2.47) 
3.97* 
(2.44) 
6.22* 
(1.76) 
5.58* 
(2.2) 
Total  5.47 
(2.17) 
3.66 
(2.46) 
2.18 
(1.93) 
3.41 
(2.25) 
3.41 
(2.34) 
3.45 
(2.36) 
5.53 
(2.22) 
4.99 
(2.42) 
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The overwhelming majority of respondents (both Jews and Arabs) strongly supported the 
denial of political rights to foreign workers. A more moderate picture arises with regard to 
social rights. Jews, especially Jews of European-American origin, and respondents of 
higher educational and income levels are more likely than others to express positive atti-
tudes for granting welfare, education and housing rights to foreign workers.  
Support to the right for minimum wage and for the enforcement of insurance policy is 
more pronounced among Jews than Arabs and is likely to rise with levels of education and 
income. In general, respondents were more supportive of employment rights for foreign 
workers to be provided by employers (minimum wage, accident insurance) than political 
and social rights to be provided by the state. 
Explaining attitudes towards foreign workers 
In this section we test the extent to which socio-demographic and background characteris-
tics explain different attitudes by estimating several OLS regression models predicting 
discrimination (Model 1), social distance (Model 2), attitudes towards consequences of 
labor migration for the local labor markets (Model 3), attitudes towards granting socio-
economic and political rights to foreign workers (Model 4), and perception of competition 
over socio-economic resources (Model 5). Results are presented in Table 6.  
The dependent variable in each model is an index constructed by a series of variables listed 
in Tables 1 to 5. Since ethnicity is related to socio-economic characteristics, it is important 
to estimate the net effect of ethnicity on attitudes toward migrant workers. The independent 
variables used in the models are: age, gender (1=male), ethnicity (the omitted category is 
Arabs), marital status (married= 1), years of formal education, income per capita, occupa-
tion (the omitted category is service and blue collar jobs), political orientation (the omitted 
category is right-wing) and religious orientation (the omitted category is orthodox). 
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Table 6: Coefficients of OLS regression equations (standard errors) predicting attitude 
toward foreign workers.   * P<.05 
 (1) Attitude 
toward dis-
crimination 
(2) Social 
Distance  
(3) Labor 
Market Con-
sequences  
(4) Socio- 
Economic 
and Political 
Rights 
(5) Competi-
tion over So-
cio-Economic 
Resources 
Age  -0.0002  
(0.002) 
-0.009*  
(0.004) 
0.008*  
(0.003) 
0.0004  
(0.004) 
-0.001  
(0.005) 
Sex  -0.01  
(0.04) 
-0.22*  
(0.09) 
-0.06  
(0.08) 
-0.03  
(0.09) 
0.07  
(0.12) 
Marital  0.002  
(0.05) 
-0.06  
(0.09) 
-0.004  
(0.09) 
0.08  
(0.09) 
-0.07  
(0.13) 
Education  0.008  
(0.007) 
0.03*  
(0.01) 
-0.02  
(0.01) 
0.03*  
(0.01) 
-0.06*  
(0.02) 
Income per 
capita  
0.00002  
(0.000) 
0.00005*  
(0.000) 
-0.00001  
(0.000) 
0.00003  
(0.000) 
-0.0001*  
(0.000) 
Professional 
and Mana-
gerial  
0.02  
(0.06) 
-0.06  
(0.13) 
-0.162  
(0.11) 
0.11  
(0.12) 
-0.36*  
(0.18) 
Sales and 
Clerks  
0.0007  
(0.06) 
-0.07  
(0.11) 
-0.2*  
(0.1) 
0.22*  
(0.11) 
-0.09  
(0.16) 
Unemployed  -0.0004  
(0.09) 
-0.099  
(0.18) 
-0.17  
(0.16) 
-0.08  
(0.17) 
-0.04  
(0.25) 
Asian- 
African 
Jews  
0.56*  
(0.07) 
0.57*  
(0.13) 
-0.16  
(0.12) 
0.89*  
(0.13) 
-0.35  
(0.19) 
European- 
American 
Jews 
0.69*  
(0.07) 
0.7*  
(0.14) 
-0.42*  
(0.12) 
0.99*  
(0.13) 
-0.79*  
(0.19) 
Left  0.26*  
(0.06) 
0.68*  
(0.13) 
-0.38*  
(0.11) 
0.59*  
(0.12) 
-0.39*  
(0.17) 
Center 0.07  
(0.05) 
0.29*  
(0.11) 
0.01  
(0.1) 
0.27*  
(0.11) 
-0.15  
(0.15) 
Traditional  0.24*  
(0.05) 
0.42*  
(0.1) 
-0.07  
(0.09) 
0.05  
(0.1) 
0.33*  
(0.15) 
secular  0.28*  
(0.06) 
0.5*  
(0.12) 
-0.4*  
(0.1) 
0.13  
(0.11) 
0.3  
(0.16) 
Constant  1.4*  
(0.13) 
-2.38*  
(0.26) 
5.88*  
(0.24) 
1.9*  
(0.26) 
4.69*  
(0.37) 
R2 0.240 0.156 0.120 0.158 0.112 
N 993 994 994 994 992 
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Attitudes towards discriminating behavior of migrant workers and social distance (Models 
1 and 2 respectively) are explained by ethnicity, religiosity and political orientation. In 
comparison to Arabs (the omitted category for ethnic contrasts) Asian-African Jews and 
most pronounced European-American Jews were less likely to express social distance and 
more likely to oppose discriminating behavior. Secular and traditional, and left oriented 
respondents were more likely (than their orthodox and right-center oriented counterparts) 
to condemn discrimination. It is interesting to note that whereas attitudes towards social 
distance were affected by class positions, income and education bored no statistical rela-
tionship to attitudes towards discrimination after controlling for other variables.  
The degree of hostility towards labor migrants’ presence in the Israeli labor market is af-
fected by age, occupation, ethnicity, religiosity and political orientation (model 3). Nega-
tive views tend to increase with age and with low-status positions, that is those respondents 
who potentially compete with foreign workers in the labor market. Likewise, anti-
immigrant sentiments are strongest for subordinate groups (Jews from Asian-African ori-
gin and Arabs), politically right-oriented and orthodox religious individuals.  
The general perception of competition over socio-economic resources, whether in the labor 
market or in other areas like education, welfare and housing (model 4) is explained by 
class position (education, income per capita and occupation). The higher the occupational 
status, educational and income levels the less likely that respondents feel that immigrants 
compete with citizens over socio-economic resources.  
Perceived threat from foreign workers is higher among Jews from Asian-African origin 
and Arabs (subordinate groups) that are more likely to depend on welfare and state re-
sources than among Jews from European-American origin (the superordinate group). Fi-
nally, negative attitudes towards labor migrants are strongest among politically right-
oriented and orthodox religious individuals.  
Education, religious orientation, and political affiliation are correlated with support for 
granting socio-economic and political rights to foreign workers in Israel (model 5). Secular 
and traditional religious respondents were more likely to have more liberal attitudes to-
wards granting socio-economic and political rights to foreign workers compared to Ortho-
dox respondents (the omitted category). Likewise politically left-oriented respondents were 
more likely than center and right-oriented respondents (the omitted category) to express 
positive views regarding concession of rights to labor migrants. These results are not sur-
prising given that religious Orthodox and right-wing oriented people tend to have a higher 
level of national and Jewish identity (compared to traditional and secular) which in turn 
affects their attitudes towards non-Jews. Finally, even after controlling for age, marital 
status, gender, education, income per capita, occupation, religiosity and political orienta-
tion, ethnicity retains a significant effect.  
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Conclusions 
The major goal of the present paper is to provide a descriptive overview of citizens’ per-
ceptions of labor migrants in Israel in an attempt to better understand the level of support 
for or opposition to the new emergent group of residents in Israeli society. Attitudes to-
wards labor migrants has long been considered an important factor in determining the way 
foreigners adapt to the host society. Public opinion is important for two reasons. First, it 
sends signals to migrants to whether they are wanted or feared. Second, public sentiments 
may be contagious, spread to others and accepted as a fact exerting pressure on govern-
ments to implement restrictive policies (Hoskin, 1991). 
The data indicate that Israelis have substantial negative attitude towards labor migrants. 
They are viewed as competitors in the labor market and in other social realms (welfare, 
education, health and housing). Most Israelis seem to be willing to deny them social and 
political rights. 
The data reveal considerable differences among respondents in the level of anti-immigrant 
sentiments. Subordinated groups (Jews from Asian-African origin and Arabs) and persons 
at the bottom end of the education and income distribution are more likely to express an-
tagonistic attitudes toward foreign workers whether in the labor market or in other arenas. 
Exclusion is especially evident in the (almost) unanimous support for denial of political 
and social rights for foreign workers. Respondents are more liberal when it comes to eco-
nomic rights such as minimum wages and insurance against work accidents as they are not 
granted by the state but by employers. 
Altogether our results show that Israelis (both Jews and Arabs) are resistant to accepting 
and integrating foreigners into Israeli society. Among Jews this is perhaps because the in-
corporation of non-Jews challenges the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and poses a 
threat to the homogeneity of the nation. Among Arabs, this is probably due to threat and 
competition over resources. 
Whatever the reason may be, the denial of access to social, economic and political entitle-
ments creates de-facto a new subordinate group in the Israeli society. Labor migrants can 
be considered thus, „margizens“, that is a new category of people who, being denied of 
membership in the host society, remain excluded in legal, social, cultural and political 
terms (Martiniello, 1994; Kemp et al., 2000). They have become the new hewers of wood 
and drawers of water in Israeli society. 
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Appendix 1:  Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents by  
Ethnicity. Percent, Means and (Standard Deviations) 
 Jews Arabs 
Age 41.23 
(12.32) 
33.99 
(9.23) 
Marital Status 73% 71.4% 
Percent Female 54% 41% 
Ethnicity 
 For Jews 
 Asia-Africa 
 Europe-America 
 Israeli Born 
 For Arabs 
 Muslems 
 Christians 
 Druse 
 
 
44.3% 
55.7% 
61.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86.1% 
6.8% 
7.1% 
Years of Formal Education 
 
13.55 
(3.48) 
11.13 
(3.43) 
Academic Degree 28% 14.4% 
Occupation   
 Academic, Professional, Technical  and 
Managerial 
38%   22.2% 
 Clerk and Sales 36.5%   31.9% 
 Service and Blue-collar  25.5%   45.9% 
Political Affiliation   
 Right 39.4% 0.6% 
 Center 33.3% 19.2% 
 Left 27.3% 80.2% 
Religiosity   
 Orthodox  20.1% 38.8% 
 Traditional   30.5% 36.8% 
 Secular  49.5% 24.4% 
N 796 309 
Appendix 2:  Attitudes Toward Entrance of Different Migrant Groups in Israel by  
Ethnicity (Percentages) 
 Asian-African Origin European-American 
Origin 
Arabs 
 
Foreign 
Workers 
Pales-
tinians 
Jewish 
Immigr
ants 
Foreign 
Workers 
Palesti
nians 
Jewish 
Immig
rants 
Foreign 
Workers 
Palesti
nians 
Jewish 
Immigr
ants 
Unrestricted 
Entrance 3.7 3.7 60.6 10.2 6.6 67.3 4.5 35.3 8.4 
Restricted 
Entrance 60.3 41.8 31.1 71.0 55.4 28.6 36.2 37.5 34.3 
Prohibited 
Entrance 36.0 54.5 8.3 18.8 38.0 4.1 59.3 27.2 57.3 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
